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Products Liability: Defenses Based on 
Plaintiff's Conduct 
By David G. Epstein·* 
!. INTRODUCTION 
The past decade has seen dramatic developments in the law of products 
liability.1 There has been liberalization of the exclusive control requirement 
of res ipsa Ioquitur, 2 Iegislative3 and judicial 4 relaxation of the privity require-
* B.A., L.L.B., University of Texas. Member of the Arizona Bar. 
1 There is no reason for believing other than that the revolutionary developments 
in the area of products liability will continue to "proceed apace." Accordingly, it 
should be noted that the research for this paper was completed on April 12, 1968. 
'The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has three universally recognized requisites: 
(1) The accident must be of a kind that does not ordinarily occur in the 
absence of negligence; 
(2) the accident must be caused by an agency or instrumentality within the 
exclusive control of the defendant; 
(3) the accident must not have been due to any voluntary action or contri-
bution of the plaintiff. 
See generally Note, Res Ipsa Loquitur: The Extent To Which Plaintiff May Estab-
lish Negligence, 42 ST. JoHNS L. R.Ev. 410 (1968). 
If the requirement of exclusive control were to be strictly applied, res ipsa loquitur 
would rarely be available in a products liability case; for in most such cases at the 
time of the accident the product is entirely within the plaintiff's control. Accordingly, 
"exclusive control" has been liberally construed. In cases involving products coming 
in sealed containers, the condition is satisfied by showing that there has been no change 
in the product from the time the defendant relinquished control to the time of the 
accident. See, e.g., Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436, 
438 (1944); Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Hobart, 423 S.W.2d 118, 125 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1967) (dictum). In Illinois, possession or control of the injuring instrumentality 
intervening between that of the manufacturer and the occurrence of the injury does 
not preclude the application of res ipsa loquitur unless the length or character of the 
intervening control indicates that the defect probably did not exist when the manu-
facturer parted with control. May v. Columbian Rope Co., 40 Ill. App. 2d 264, 271-
73, 189 N.E.2d 394, 397 (1963) (dictum). 
3 Section 2-318 of the Uniform Commercial Code dispenses with the privity require-
ment to a limited extent. The section extends the seller's liability to persons in the 
buyer's family or household and to guests in his home who are injured because of 
breach of a warranty. See also Rapson, Products Liability Under Parallel Doctrines: 
Contrasts Between the Uniform Commercial Code and Strict Liability in Tort, 19 
RUTGERS L. REV. 692 (1965); Comment, UCC Section 2-318: Effect on Washington 
Requirements of Privity in Products Liability Suits, 42 WASH. L. R.Ev. 253 (1966). 
There is considerable controversy as to whether the privity reform effected by the Code 
is sufficient. See, e.g., Dippel v. Sciano, 155 N.W.2d 55, 60 (Wis. 1967); FACT FINDING 
Co?>U>!. ON JUDICIARY, SENATE OF THE STATE OF CALIF., SIXTH PROGRESS REPORT TO 
THE LEGISLATURE, PART 1: THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CoDE 457 (1961). But cf. 
Bailey, Sales Warranties, Products Liability and the UCC: A Lab Analysis of the 
Cases, 4 WILLAMETTE L.J. 291, 315-23 (1967). Accordingly, a number of states have 
altered the language of section 2-318 or enacted additional statutory provisions to 
eliminate further the privity requirement. See generally Emroch, Statutory Elimination 
of Privity Requirement in Products Liability Cases, 48 VA. L. R.Ev. 982 (1962); Note, 
Caveat Venditor-Strict Products Liability Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 
16 KAN. L. R.Ev. 285 (1968). 
4 MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111N.E.1050 (1916), eliminated 
the privity requirement in a negligence action involving an instrumentality known to 
be dangerous if defective. Today, in every jurisdiction, the privity requirement has 
been abolished for all negligence actions. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel 
(Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1100-03 (1960). At the time 
of Prosser's article, Mississippi still required privity in negligence actions; this was 
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ment, and creation of a new theory of recovery - strict liability in tort. 5 Con-
sequently, many jurisdictions now offer three theories of recovery to persons 
injured through use of a defective product: negligence, breach of warranty, 
and strict liability in tort. Although the recent products liability developments 
have been extensively treated both by courts and by commentators, numerous 
problems remain. 6 One of the most pressing problems is the availability of 
defenses based on the conduct of the plaintiff. 
II. POSSIBLE DEFENSES 
In a products liability context, three basic categories of plaintiff conduct 
might constitute defenses to an action for personal injuries sustained through 
use of a defective product: 
( 1) negligent failure to discover the defective condition; 
(2) use of the product after discovery of the defect; 
( 3) use of the product in a manner that could not reasonably have been 
foreseen by the manufacturer. 
Contributory negligence, as it is generally defined, 1 is sufficiently broad to 
encompass all three categories. Accordingly, there are products liability cases 
that speak of failure to discover the product's defective condition as consti-
tuting contributory negligence; 8 others that so categorize use of the product 
changed in State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113 (Miss. 1966), cert. denied, 
386 U.S. 912 ( 1967). 
In warranty, the privity requirement was first abolished in cases where the product 
involved was either a food stuff or a drug. See, e.g., Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 
Wash. 622, 135 P. 633 (1913). It was not until 1960, in Henningsen v. Bloomfield 
Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960), that the requirement was abolished 
in a non-food or drug case. After Henningsen, other courts took similar action in what 
Dean Prosser has described as the "most spectacular overturn of an established rule in 
the entire history of torts." Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the 
Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REv. 791, 794 (1966). 
For a more detailed treatment of the history of the abolition of the privity require-
ment see Lambert, Storming of the Citadel: Waning of the Privity Rule in Implied 
Warranty Cases, 1963 PERSONAL INJURY ANNUAL 533. 
• There is some controversy as to whether strict liability in tort is a "new theory of 
recovery." Recently, in Dunham v. Vaughn & Bushnell Mfg. Co., 229 N.E.2d 684 
(Ill. Ct. App. 1967), the court said: "We have ... discovered scholarly authority that 
the strict liability theory is essentially the liability of implied warranty divested of the 
contract doctrines of privity, disclaimer and notice." 229 N.E.2d at 693. There is 
also "scholarly authority" to the contrary. See Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 
853, 855-56 ( 1966) (dissenting opinion); Smyser, Products Liability and the Ameri-
can Law Institute: A Petition for Rehearing, 42 U. DET. L.J. 343 ( 1965). Strict 
liability in tort has been described as "the most radical and spectacular development 
in tort law during this century." American Law Institute Meeting, 32 U.S.L.W. 2623, 
2627 (1964). 
6 See Percy, Products Liability-Tort or Contract or What?, 40 TuL. L. REV. 715 
( 1966). 
7 The Restatement definition of contributory negligence is as follows: 
Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the plaintiff which falls 
below the standard to which he should conform for his own protection, and 
which is a legally contributing cause co-operating with the negligence of the 
defendant in bringing about the plaintiff's harm. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 463 (1965). 
8 See, e.g., Kassouf v. Lee Bros., Inc., 209 Cal. App. 2d 568, 26 Cal. Rptr. 276 
(1962); Brockett v. Harrell Bros., Inc., 206 Va. 457, 143 S.E.2d 897 (1965). 
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after discovery of the defect;9 and still others that use "contributory negli-
gence" to mean that plaintiff's negligence was the sole proximate cause of the 
injuries.10 These disparate definitions of "contributory negligence" are largely 
responsible for the confusion that exists in products liability cases concerning 
the availability of defenses based on the plaintiff's conduct. 
For example, in Kassouf v. Lee Brothers, Incorporated,11 plaintiff brought 
a breach of implied warranty action against the seller and manufacturer of a 
chocolate bar. While reading one evening, the plaintiff took a candy bar from 
her dinner table and, without looking, opened the wrapper and extracted the 
bar. She immediately noticed that the candy didn't taste "just right," but 
she thought that it was because she had not eaten all day. About one-third 
of the way through the candy bar, she bit into a "mushy'' worm. Needless to 
say, plaintiff became extremely ill. Defendant argued that she was guilty of 
contributory negligence. Using the term "contributory negligence" to mean 
failure to discover the danger in the product or to take precaution against its 
possible existence, the court held that contributory negligence is no defense 
in a breach of implied warranty suit, saying: "Contributory negligence, in 
general, is a defense only to actions grounded on negligence." 12 The case of 
Nelson v. Anderson13 similarly involved an alleged breach of implied war-
1 
ranty. The plaintiff had continued to use an oil burner that he knew was not 
1
, 
functioning properly and was injured when the burner exploded. The court, 
using the term "contributory negligence" to mean use after discovery of the 
defect, held: "The weight of authority and sound reason support the view 
that, in an action based on breach of implied warranty, contributory negli-
gence of the buyer is a good defense .... " 14 From the language of the hold-
ings in these two cases a casual reader would probably conclude that the two 
cases are irreconcilable. Yet this is not necessarily true. The Kassouf court 
might hold that use after discovery of a defect is a defense; the Nelson court 
might find that negligent failure to discover a defective condition is not a 
defense. These two cases cle~rly illustrate that a distinct and more definite 
terminology is needed to describe the plaintiff's conduct in a products lia-
bility action. 
There is a bit of Lewis G. Carroll's Humpty Dumpty15 in each of us. 
Everyone - especially appellate court judges and contributors to legal peri-
odicals - has the tendency to arbitrarily define terms. Succumbing to the 
•See, e.g., Barefield v. La Salle Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 370 Mich. 1, 120 N.W.2d 
786 (1963) (drinking coke after should have discovered broken glass in bottle); cf. 
Fredendall v. Abraham & Straus, Inc., 279 N.Y. 146, 18 N.E.2d 11 (1938) (use of 
cleaning agent in close quarters after reading label warning against such use). 
'"See, e.g., Dallison v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 313 F.2d 343 (10th Cir. 1962) 
(wearing nightgown to smoke); Gardner v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 267 Minn. 505, 
127 N.W.2d 557 (1964) (improperly opening bottle). 
11 209 Cal. App. 2d 568, 26 Cal. Rptr. 276 ( 1962). 
"' 26 Cal. Rptr. at 278. 
13 245 Minn. 445, 72 N.W.2d 861 (1955). 
",72 N.W.2d at 865. 
1.0 " 'When I use a word,' Humpty Dumpty said, in a rather scornful tone, 'it means 
just what I want it to mean - neither more nor less.' " L. CARROLL, THROUGH THE 
LOOKING GLAss, ch. 6. 
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"Hwnpty-Dumpty Syndrome," I propose the following labeling system for 
use in this article: 
( 1) Negligent failure to discover the defect will be referred to as "con-
tributory negligence"; 
(2) use of the product after discovery will be called "asswnption of the 
risk" ; 16 and 
(3) use of the product in a manner that could not have been reasonably 
foreseen by the manufacturer will be termed "misuse." 
This terminology is not in itself significant; the labels merely reflect the lan-
guage most widely used by the courts and legal writers. The use of three 
separate terms is significant, however, since in products liability cases it is 
necessary to distinguish the term "contributory negligence." 
III. NEGLIGENCE 
The basic elements of negligence in a products liability case are the same 
as those in any tort litigation: duty, breach of duty, cause in fact, proximate 
or legal cause, and damages.17 It is only logical that the same defenses are 
available; as a matter of legal theory, therefore, both contributory negli-
gence18 and asswnption of the risk19 are defenses to a products liability claim 
based on negligence. 
As a practical matter, however, contributory negligence is rarely a com-
plete defense in any negligence matter. 20 Generally, the issue of contributory 
negligence is factual21 and one for jury determination. Jurors, however, are 
likely to be sympathetic to the plaintiff - especially in the usual products 
liability situation in which an individual who has suffered personal injuries 
attempts to recover from a major manufacturing concern.22 
16 In a number of jurisdictions, the term "assumption of risk" has been used to desig-
nate a specific doctrine applicable to definite contractual relationships such as master 
and servant. See generally Greenhill, Assumption of Risk, 16 BAYLOR L. REV. 111 
( 1964). Here "assumption of risk" is being used to describe a person's actions. 
11 See generally P. Keeton, Products Liability-Problems Pertaining to Proof of Neg-
ligence, 19 Sw. L.J. 26 ( 1965); Witherspoon, Manufacturer's Negligence in Products 
Liability Cases, 5 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REV. 585 (1964). 
18 "[T]here is little if anything truly distinctive to products liability cases in so far as 
the issue of contributory negligence is concerned .... " 1 R. HuRsH, AMERICAN LAW 
OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2: 121 ( 1961). 
1
• Id. at 2:124. 
20 See Bushnell, Illusory Defense of Contributory Negligence in Product Liability, 12 
CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 412 (1963). 
21 There are, of course, instances even in a products liability case where the plaintiff 
is found to be contributorily negligent as a matter of law. See 1 L. FRUMER & M. 
FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY§ 13.01, at 346.1 (1967). 
22 For example, in Independent Nail and Packing Co. v. Mitchell, 343 F.2d 819 
(1st Cir. 1965), the plaintiff was injured when a portion of a pole barn nail he struck 
with a hammer broke off and hit him in the eye, destroying all vision in that eye. 
Plaintiff had been using pole barn nails for the five or six days prior to the injury. 
When he was hammering the nails into the softer wood of the poles, about three per 
cent would break off an inch from the head. The free part of the nail would then 
"zing" through the air. When hammering the nails into the harder green oak siding, 
about five percent would break. Despite the high incidence of "flying nails," plaintiff 
did not wear safety glasses. Plaintiff sued the manufacturer, alleging negligence. 
Defendant asserted the defense of contributory negligence, but the jury found for the 
plaintiff, in the sum of $40,209.75. 
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In a products liability case, the manufacturer's negligence may take such 
forms as improper design, 23 negligent construction or assembly, 24 or failure 
to adequately warn the users of all attendant dangers.25 With regard to this 
last category there has been considerable conflict concerning the applicability 
of contributory negligence and assumption of risk. In a widely cited law 
review article, Dean Hardy Dillard of the University of Virginia School of 
Law and Harris Hart of the Virginia Bar state: 
To allow these defenses - contributory negligence and assumption of 
the risk - is to indulge in circular reasoning, since usually the plaintiff 
cannot be said to have assumed a risk of which he was ignorant or to 
have contributed to his own injury when he had no way of reasonably 
ascertaining that the danger of in jury existed. 26 
Several reported cases take this position.27 However, the authors of the two 
leading treatises in the area of products liability espouse the view that con-
tributory negligence may be a defense in some cases.28 As even Dillard and 
Hart concede, 29 supporting cases can be found. 30 In most of this latter group 
of cases, however, while the courts speak in terms of contributory negligence, 
recovery was actually denied because ( 1) the warning was adequate, or (2) 
inadequacy of the warning was not the cause in fact of the injury complained 
of. Swift & Company v. Phillips31 is a notable example.32 
The plaintiff in Swift & Company had on numerous occasions used the 
"amine type" weed killer manufactured by defendant; he was sold the "ester 
type" manufactured by defendant and told that it was the same type weed 
killer he had been purchasing. Without reading any of the printing on the 
23 See, e.g., Varas v. Barco Mfg. Co., 205 Cal. App. 2d 246, 22 Cal. Rptr. 737 
(1962). See also Nader & Page, Automobile Design and the Judicial Process, 55 CALIF. 
L. REv. 645 (1967). 
"See, e.g., Phillips v. Ogle Aluminum Furniture, Inc., 106 Cal. App. 2d 650, 235 
P.2d 857 (1951); 1 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY§ 6 (1967). 
""See, e.g., Gall v. Union Ice Co., 108 Cal. App. 2d 303, 239 P.2d 48 (1951); 
Bine v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 68 PRODS. LIABILITY R.l'TR. para. 5890 (Mo. 1968); Noel, 
Recent Trends in Manufacturers' Negligence as to Design, Instructions or Warnings, 
19 Sw. L.J. 43 (1965); Note, The Manufacturer's Duty To Warn of Dangers Involved 
in Use of a Product, 1967 WASH. U.L.Q. 206. 
""Dillard & Hart, Product Liability: Directions for Use and the Duty To Warn, 
41 VA. L. REv. 145, 163 (1955) • 
.. E.g., McClanahan v. California Spray-Chem. Corp., 194 Va. 842, 75 S.E.2d 712, 
725 (1953). 
"'See 1 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 8.06, at 169 (1967); 
1 R. HuRsH, AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY§ 2.52, at 231 (1961). 
""See Dillard & Hart, supra note 26. 
"'See, e.g., Weekes v. Michigan Chrome & Chem. Co., 352 F.2d 603 {6th Cir. 
1965); Annot., 76 A.L.R.2d 9, 72-74 ( 1961). 
31 314 S.W.2d 326 {Tex. Civ. App. 1958). 
= The question in Swift was whether the trial court properly declared a Inistrial on 
the ground that the jury's answers to the special issues were in irreconcilable conflict. 
The jury found (1) the manufacturer was negligent in failing to have adequate infor· 
:mation on the container of the product in question; (2) this was a proximate cause 
of the injuries complained of; (3) the plaintiff was contributorily negligent in failing 
to read all of the printed :material on the can; ( 4) this was also a proximate cause 
of the plaintiff's injuries. The court held that the jury's findings were not in conflict 
and the defendant had a right to have the trial court render a judgment on the verdict. 
For a thorough and understandable explanation of the special issue submission 
practice in Texas, see G. HODGES, SPECIAL IssuE SuB11nssION IN TEXAS (1959). 
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can, plaintiff used the weed killer and his crops were damaged. The court 
reasoned that the directions on the can might have been inadequate, but that 
had the plaintiff read them he would not have used the weed killer because 
he would have discovered that it was not the same type that he had been 
using. In a situation such as this - where the plaintiff has special knowledge 
such that even a warning that fails to satisfy the manufacturer's duty to warn 
causes him to exercise "caution commensurate with the danger'' - it cannot 
be said that the inadequacy of the warning was the cause in fact of the injury. 
Cause in fact requires a "but for" relationship. This relationship does not 
exist in cases like Swift & Company. In such cases recovery should be denied 
because there is no causal relationship between the negligent failure to warn 
and the injury alleged- not because the plaintiff was contributorily negligent 
or assumed the risk. 
Although numerous opinions 33 and law review writings 34 have considered 
contributory negligence in a products liability context, relatively little has 
appeared in print about assumption of the risk in a products case.35 The 
reported cases that do discuss the doctrine adhere to the recent trend in all 
negligence cases to limit its availability to cases of subjective appreciation -
i.e., the plaintiff in fact realized the nature of the hazard created by the 
defendant's negligence. While there has been some discussion of whether the 
standard should be objective or subjective, this question is of limited practical 
significance. Where it is not possible to establish that the plaintiff actually 
realized the nature of the risk involved, but it can be shown that he should 
have appreciated the danger, contributory negligence will bar recovery.36 
Although there is general agreement that in a negligence-based products 
liability claim use of the product in a manner that could not have been 
reasonably foreseen by the manufacturer precludes recovery, 37 there is wide-
spread disagreement about the basis of the defense. The prevalent practice is 
to treat misuse as an element of foreseeability 38 - i.e., a seller is liable for all 
injuries which an ordinary prudent man so situated could have reasonably 
foreseen. While some courts have taken a narrow view as to what constitutes 
a normal use,39 most jurisdictions have held sellers to a duty to anticipate 
33 See, e.g., Maiorino v. Weco Prods. Co., 45 N.J. 570, 214 A.2d 18 ( 1965); Sham-
rock Fuel & Oil Sales, Co. v. Tunks, 416 S.W.2d 779 (Tex. 1967). 
"'See, e.g., Weston, Contributory Negligence in Product Liability, 12 CLEv.-MAR. 
L. REv. 424 ( 1963); Comment, Products Liability: For the Defense - Contributory 
Fault, 33 TENN. L. REv. 464 (1966). 
33 Perhaps the dearth of secondary material is due to the excellent article by Pro-
fessor Robert Keeton, Assumption of Risk in Products Liability Cases, 22 LA . .bJ.U:v. 
122 (1961). Writers (and, more important, law review editors) might wel~at 
this pre-empts the area. 
""See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 496A (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1963). 
:r. See, e.g., Neusus v. B.D. Sponholtz, 369 F.2d 259 (7th Cir. 1966) (by implica-
tion); Westerberg v. School Dist., 148 N.W.2d 312 (Minn. 1967). 
33 See 1 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY§ 15 (1967). 
""See, e.g., Borg-Warner Corp. v. Heine, 128 F.2d 657 (6th Cir. 1942); Schneider 
v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 266 F. Supp. 115 (D. Neb. 1967) (by implication). See also 
Dale & Hilton, Use of the Product - When Is It Abnormal?, 4 WILLAMETTE L.J. 350, 
361-63 (1967). 
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some relatively unusual uses.4° For example, standing on a dressing table stool 
which collapsed41 has been held to be a foreseeable use, and the foreseeability 
of eating coffee has been held a question for the jury.42 
Misuse has also been recognized in some jurisdictions as a separate affirma-
tive defense.43 This theoretical dispute raises a problem of considerable 
practical significance. If misuse is a separate affirmative defense, the burden 
of proof is on the defendant; if misuse is an element of foreseeability, the 
burden of proof is on the plaintiff. In the usual negligence action the burden 
of proving foreseeability is on the plaintiff. There is no reason for a contrary 
rule in a products liability action. 
Inherent in all areas of the law is the policy of discouraging persons against 
whom wrongs have been committed from passively suffering avoidable losses 
or from increasing the loss by continuing in their conduct.44 This basic con-
cept, commonly referred to as the avoidable consequences limitation on 
damages, operates to deny a plaintiff recovery for damages he could have 
reasonably avoided45 that are incurred subsequent to his discovery of the 
defect. Thus, in Missouri Bag Company v. Chemical Delinting Company,46 
the court denied a claim for losses caused by holes in seed bags where the 
plaintiff had discovered the defects before he used the bags. In applying the 
doctrine of avoidable consequences, the court stated: 
A person seeking to recover damages caused by the purchase of defective 
articles ... can only recover such damages as he could not have avoided 
by the exercise of reasonable diligence; and he is required to make 
reasonable effort to protect himself from loss.47 
Although they do resemble one another, two basic distinctions belie the 
similarities of the avoidable consequences doctrine and assumption of risk. 
Assumption of risk negates liability and bars recovery in most jurisdictions, 
whereas avoidable consequences does not affect the issue of liability and only 
reduces the amount of recovery. Moreover, since assumption of risk is 
an affirmative defense, it must be pleaded by the defendant; avoidable con-
sequences goes to mitigation of damages and thus need not be pleaded. 
IV. WARRANTY 
A. Common Law Warranty 
Common law warranty has been variously described as "having its com-
mencement in contract and its termination in tort"48 and as "a curious 
.. See, e.g., Hardman v. Helene Curtis Indus., Inc., 48 Ill. App. 2d 42, 198 N.E.2d 
681, 691 (1964); Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 
50 MINN. L. REv. 791, 825 (1966). 
"See Nettles v. Forbes Motel, Inc., 182 So. 2d 572 (La. Ct. App. 1966). 
""See Maddox Coffee Co. v. Collins, 46 Ga. App. 220, 167 S.E. 306 (1932). 
••See Lawson v. Benjamin Ansehl Co., 180 S.W.2d 751, 754 (Mo. Ct. App. 1944); 
cf. Farley v. Edward E. Tower & Co., 271 Mass. 230, 171 N.E. 639 (1930). . 
.. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 336 (1932); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS 
§ 918 ( 1939). 
""See generally C. McCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES §§ 33-42 
( 1935). 
""214 Miss. 13, 58 So. 2d 71 (1952) . 
., Id. at 76-77. 
48 Santor v. A. & M. Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305, 311 (1965). 
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hybrid, born of the illicit intercourse of tort and contract, unique in the 
law." 49 Suffice it to say, although today warranty is regarded as contractual 
in nature, 50 it was originally an action sounding in tort and has not yet 
entirely lost its original tort character. 51 Because of the historical develop-
ment of warranty, 52 contractual defenses such as disclaimer and notice may 
be properly urged in an action based on breach of warranty. 53 
As the excerpts from Kassouf and Nelson 54 indicate, the availability of 
defenses emanating from plaintiff's conduct in an implied warranty action is 
a most confused matter. Although a number of cases espouse the Nelson 
court's view that contributory negligence is a defense,55 the majority of the 
cases seem to be in agreement with Kassouf that it is not a defense.56 Several 
leading authorities in the products liability area have attempted to formulate 
a classification by analyzing the broad assertions of law. They have concluded 
that contributory negligence does not constitute a defense to breach of an 
implied warranty and that assumption of the risk and misuse do bar recov-
ery. 57 The authorities have recognized several different grounds upon which 
courts might consider misuse to be a defense: (1) failure to prove the use 
was within the scope of the warranty; 58 (2) failure to prove defective con-
49 W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS§ 95, at 651 (3d ed. 1964). 
ro See Gillam, Products Liability in a Nutshell, 37 ORE. L. REV. 119, 147 (1958). 
51 W. PROSSER, supra note 49, at 651-52. 
""For a history of warranty, see Prosser, The Implied Warranty of Merchantable 
Quality, 27 MINN. L. REV. 117, 118-22 (1943). 
"'As Professor Gilmore observed, "Lawyers have a professionally inbred passion for 
speculating on the 'true nature' of things." 2 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN 
PERSONAL PROPERTY § 37.2 ( 1965). Accordingly, it must be acknowledged that con-
tractual defenses such as disclaimer and notice are not actually "defenses based on 
plaintiff's conduct." More accurately, they are defenses based on the lack of conduct 
by the plaintiff. It is submitted, however, that the benefits of a complete discussion 
of available defenses outweighs any logical inconsistency. 
Because today in 49 states the availability of these defenses is governed by specific 
Uniform Commercial Code provisions, discussion of them will be reserved for the sub-
section of the article by that title. 
"'Notes 11-14 supra and accompanying text. 
"'E.g., Dallison v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 313 F.2d 343 (10th Cir. 1962) (adopting 
merely the trial court's determination that negligence is a defense) (Colorado law); 
Gardner v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 267 Minn. 505, 127 N.W.2d 557, 562 (1964). 
"'See, e.g., Vassallo v. Sabatte Land Co., 212 Cal. App. 2d 11, 27 Cal. Rptr. 814 
(1963); Shamrock Fuel & Oil Sales Co. v. Tunks, 416 S.W.2d 779 (Tex. 1967). 
Hursh states: "The weight - which is hardly a great weight - of authority appears 
to be on the side of the view that negligence on the part of a user of a product is no 
defense in a breach of warranty action .... " 1 R. HURSH, AMERICAN LAW OF 
PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 3.9, at 416 (1961). See 2 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, 
PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 16.01 (3) (1967). The authors equate the general duty of due 
care with the inadvisability of requiring the consumer "to make any sort of detailed or 
expert examination." Therefore, they conclude that only negligence, as "the equiva-
lent of unreasonable exposure to a known and appreciated risk," should be a defense to 
breach of implied warranty. See notes 57 and 121 infra. 
"'See Lascher, Strict Liability in Tort for Defective Products: The Road to and 
Past Vandermark, 38 So. CAL. L. REV. 30 ( 1965); Noel, Products Liability of Retailers 
and Manufacturers in Tennessee, 32 TENN. L. REV. 207, 247-51 (1965); Wade, 
Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5, 21-22 (1965) (no discussion of 
misuse); cf. W. PROSSER, supra note 49, at 656-57. 
03 See, e.g., Magee v. Wyeth Labs. Inc., 214 Cal. App. 2d 340, 29 Cal. Rptr. 322 
(1963); Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co. v. Langley, 422 S.W.2d 773, 780 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1967). 
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dition; 59 and (3) failure to prove causation.60 Under any one of the three, 
however, misuse is not a defense; rather, proper use is an essential element 
of the plaintiff's case. This categorization accurately reflects the holdings of 
the cases that have been reported to present date. The relevant cases fully 
support the view that assumption of risk is a defense in an action based on 
breach of warranty. 61 No reported case has held that contributory negligence, 
as the term is defined in this article,62 is a defense in a warranty action.63 
The rationale generally advanced for rejecting the defense of contributory 
negligence in warranty cases is that it is a tort defense, while warranty actions 
are contractual in nature: Realistically, however, such an argument cannot 
be the true reason for the rule., Assumption of risk is also a tort defense, yet 
it operates to prevent recovery in a warranty actio:q. 65 
B. Uniform Commercial Code Warranty 
At present, the Uniform Commercial Code has been adopted in forty-nine 
states. As the Code has grown in popularity, numerous legal writers have 
suggested that products liability litigation based on contract be governed by 
the Uniform Commercial Code instead of section 402A of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts.66 
m See, e.g., Swain v. Boeing Airplane Co., 337 F.2d 940 (2d Cir. 1964); Preston v. 
Up-Right, Inc., 242 Cal. App. 2d 594, 52 Cal. Rptr. 679 (1966). 
co Martinez v. Nichols Conveyor & Eng'r Co., 243 Cal. App. 2d 795, 52 Cal. Rptr. 
842, 845 (1966); Hays v. Western Auto Supply Co., 405 S.W.2d 877 (Mo. 1966). 
•
1 See, e.g., Barefield v. La Salle Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 370 Mich. 1, 120 N.W.2d 
786 (1963) (allowing the substantive defense, but disapproving a strict tort law appli-
cation); Ferraro v. Ford Motor Co., 423 Pa. 324, 223 A.2d 746 ( 1966). 
""See note 16 supra and accompanying text. 
""In cases similar to Nelson, it is not possible to ascertain what the courts mean by 
the term "contributory negligence." However, in Pepsi Cola Bottling Co. v. Superior 
Burner Serv. Co., 427 P.2d 833 (Alas. 1967), the court stated: "We think that the 
defense of contributory negligence, or the related defense of assumption of risk, would 
be applicable." Id. at 842 (emphasis added). The court went so far as to say that the 
defense of causation "merges with the defense of contributory negligence and assump-
tion of risk .... " Id. at 843. Prosser has found that a number of cases following Nelson 
can be distinguished as actually being assumption of risk cases. W. PROSSER, supra note 
49; see note 126 infra. 
"'See, e.g., Jarnot v. Ford Motor Co., 191 Pa. Super. 422, 156 A.2d 568 (1959). 
One writer distinguished the applicable defenses on the basis of whether an express 
or an implied warranty is in issue. Express warranty would obviously sound only in 
contract, whereas implied warranty emanates from tort principles, although it originally 
required contractual consent and prlvity. Therefore, contributory negligence would 
only be an appropriate defense under the latter theory of recovery in tort. Bushnell, 
Illusory Defense of Contributory Negligence in Product Liability, 12 CLEv.-MAR. L. 
REV. 412, 421-22 (1963). 
cs The theoretical inconsistency in disallowing the defense of assumption of risk 
in a breach of warranty action was clearly brought out in the recent case of Pritchard 
v. Liggett & Meyers Tobacco Co., 350 F.2d 479 (3d Cir. 1965), where the court 
stated: "[A]ssumption of risk ... is available as a defense in an action for personal 
injuries based on negligence. It follows as a matter of logic that the same defense 
is apposite in an action based on breach of express warranty." Id. at 485. Yet on the 
very same page the Pritchard court held that contributory negligence was not a defense 
in an action for personal injuries based on breach of warranty. 
ro See, e.g., Kessler, Products Liability, 76 YALE L.J. 887, 905 (1967); Shanker, 
Strict Tort Theory of Products Liability and the Uniform Commercial Code: A Com-
mentary on Jurisprudential Eclipses, Pigeonholes, and Communication Barriers, 17 W. 
RES. L. REv. 5 ( 1965); cf. Weaver, Allocation of Risk in Products Liability Cases: 
The Need for a Revised Third-Party-Beneficiary Theory in U.C.C. Warranty Actions, 
52 VA. L. REV. 1028 (1966). 
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The general products liability provision of the Code, section 2-314, imposes 
liability on the seller of an unmerchantable product, under the theory of 
breach of an implied warranty of merchantability, for damages incurred 
because of the product's defective condition. Subsection 2 ( c) of section 
2-314 seemingly establishes that misuse of a product will bar recovery: 
"Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as are fit for the ordinary 
purposes for which such goods are used .... " This language indicates that 
under the Code, as in negligence and in common law warranty, it is the 
plaintiff's burden to prove that he made an "ordinary use" of the product, 
and a Pennsylvania district court has ruled accordingly. 67 
The Code affords an alternate theory of recovery- implied warranty of 
fitness - that is applicable in a more limited number of cases.68 To prevail 
under this theory, the plaintiff must establish that ( 1) the seller knew the 
particular purpose for which the goods were required, (2) the buyer relied 
on the seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish goods suitable for this 
purpose, and (3) the goods were not in fact suitable for this purpose.69 By 
the very nature of this remedy, plaintiff has a cause of action only where he 
has used the product in the manner indicated to the seller; in other words, 
misuse, as defined herein, is a defense. 
There is also language in section 2-316 of the Code that bears on the 
question of the availability of the defense of contributory negligence, as the 
term is herein defined, in an action under the Code for breach of implied 
warranty of merchantability or fitness: 
[W]hen the buyer before entering into the contract has examined the 
goods or the sample or model as fully as desired or has refused to exam-
ine the goods there is no implied warranty with regard to defects which 
an examination ought in the circumstances to have revealed to him .... 
This seems to indicate that under the Code, negligent failure to discover a 
defect from a presale inspection bars recovery; however, there is no reported 
case so holding. A student writer in the Southwestern Law Journal seems to 
take the position that under this provision failure to inspect or discover before 
use gives rise to the defense of contributory negligence.70 This is not what the 
section provides; at most, it applies only to failure to inspect or discover 
before the sale. There is no Code language relating to contributory negli-
gence arising from an inspection taking place after the sale. Therefore, the 
availability of contributory negligence in an action under the Uniform Com-
mercial Code depends upon when the contributory negligence occurred; in 
cases in which the buyer has examined or has refused to examine the goods, 
assumption of ~sk is a defense. 
"'Robert H. Carr & Sons, Inc. v. Yearsley, 31 Pa. D. & C.2d 262 (1963) . 
.. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-315 . 
.. See generally DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, PRODUCTS LIABILITY: IMPLIED 
WARRANTIES 7-8 (1964). 
1° Comment, Strict Products Liability-Its Application and Meaning, 21 Sw. L.J. 
629, 645 (1967). 
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Disclaimer has been considered as a contractual form of assumption of the 
risk.71 Since all warranties are subject to a disclaimer,72 a manufacturer or 
seller might, by means of a judiciously worded disclaimer, avoid liability for 
injuries caused by negligent use or misuse of a product. Recently, however, 
the enforcement of certain limitations on warranty have come under attack.~3 
In Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Incorporated,14 the buyer's wife sus-
tained personal injuries when the steering mechanism of their new car failed. 
In allowing a cause of action based on breach of implied warranty, the New 
Jersey Supreme Court held the standard warranty disclaimer of the Automo-
bile Manufacturers' Association unenforceable as contrary to public policy. 
Speaking to the warranty limitation, the court stressed the "gross inequality 
of bargaining position" 75 between a car buyer and a major automobile manu-
facturer. While the Henningsen decision has been well received by the com-
mentators,76 judicial reaction has been mixed. Marshall v. Murray Oldsmo-
bile Gompany71 enforced the very same warranty disclaimer involved in Hen-
ningsen, and numerous other recent cases have upheld similar disclaimer 
provisions. 78 
Clearly some warranty disclaimers should be unenforceable as a matter of 
public policy. The average consumer is helpless when confronted with a 
warranty disclaimer. Disclaimers often appear in small print on the back of 
a standard form. Since the seller is usually without authority to vary the terms 
of these clauses, the consumer who happens to notice the disclaimer will be 
in no better position than one who did not. This is not to say that the courts 
should nullify all disclaimers. To the contrary, reasonable guidelines for deter-
mining the enforceability of disclaimers are provided in relevant Uniform 
Commercial Code sections.79 Under the Code, a disclaimer of implied war-
71 See Keeton, Assumption of Risk in Products Liability Cases, 22 LA. L. REV. 120, 
136 (1961) . 
.,.See, e.g., 77 C.J.S. Sales§ 317 (1952). See generally Prosser, The Implied Wa-r-
ranty of Merchantable Quality, 27 MINN. L. REv. 117, 157-67 (1943). 
0 
"'See, e.g., Keeton, supra note 71, at 135 & n.26; Note, Disclaimers of Warranty in 
Consumer Sales, 77 lIARv. L. REv. 318 (1963). 
"32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960). 
•• 161 A.2d at 87. 0 
•a See, e.g., 1 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 128 ( 1963) ; Philo, Automobile Products 
Liability Litigation, 4 DUQUESNE U.L. REv. 181, 185-87 (1966); Prosser, The Fall 
of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REv. 791, 832-33 
(1966). But cf. Boshkoff, Some Thoughts About Physical Harm, Disclaimers and 
Warranties, 4 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REv. 285, 305-06 (1963) (rejecting disparity of 
bargaining power as a basis for the decision). 
"207 Va. 972, 154 S.E.2d 140, 144 (1967). The Marshall court refused to follow 
the New Jersey precedent on the ground that rejection of the disclaimer would run 
counter to established freedom of contract principles in automotive dealings. Moreover, 
since the Uniform Commercial Code, adopted by Virginia in 1964, provided specifically 
for exclusion of an implied warranty of fitness in § 2-316, the court reasoned that the 
legislature did not endorse the considerations of public policy underlying Henningsen. 
Id. at 144-45. 
••see, e.g., Brown v. Chrysler Corp., 112 Ga. App. 22, 143 S.E.2d 575 (1965) 
(defect did not cause personal injury); DeGrendele Motors, Inc. v. Reeder, 382 S.W.2d 
431 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964) (opinion expressly limited to cases not involving personal 
injury); Williams v. Chrysler Corp., 137 S.E.2d 225 (W. Va. 1964). 
70 See generally 1 w. HAWKLAND, A TRANSACTIONAL GUIDE TO THE UNIFORM 
Co111111ERCIAL CODE§ 1.190303-04, at 75-85 (1964). 
0 
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ranty must be conspicuous80 and must not be unconscionable.81 While it is 
difficult to predict what disclaimers the courts will hold unconscionable, it 
seems unlikely that unconscionability will attach to a disclaimer absolving 
the manufacturer from responsibility for losses incurred through the user's 
lack of care or bizarre use of a product. 
Section 2-607 ( 3) (a) of the Code provides that where "a tender has been 
accepted ... the buyer must within a reasonable time after he discovers or 
should have discovered any breach notify the seller of breach or be barred 
from any remedy." 82 On its face, this section does not require that notice be 
given by parties who are not buyers, but who are entiled to recover under 
section 2-318; the comments accompanying the section, however, make it 
clear that notice must be given by such parties.83 Since the Code is neutral 
as to whether warranty extends beyond the buyer, his family, household, and 
guests, these official cements are of limited importance. The question remains 
whether persons not within the scope of section 2-318 must give notice in 
order to recover under a breach of warranty theory. No Code cases consider 
this question. There is, however, a line of Sales Act cases which indicate that 
such persons will not be required to give notice.84 For example, in Ruderman 
v. Warner Lambert Pharmaceutical Company,85 the court reasoned that since 
Uniform Sales Act warranty coverage was limited to instances in which the 
parties were in privity, the Sales Act notice provision86 had no application to 
an action between the buyer and a manufacturer who was not the seller. 
v. STRICT LIABILITY IN TORT 
Recognition of strict liability in tort as a theory supporting recovery for 
personal injuries sustained through use of a defective product is a recent 
development in the law of products liability. Until 1962, the only judicial 
authority encouraging such a position was the concurring opinion of Justice 
Traynor in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Company.81 In 1963, Traynor reit-
80 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-316. "Conspicuous" is defined as: "'Con-
spicuous': A term ... is conspicuous when it is so written that a reasonable person 
against whom it is to operate ought to have noticed it." UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 
1-201(10). See generally Hunt v. Perkins Mach. Co., 226 N.E.2d 228 (Mass. 1967). 
81 "Unconscionable" is not among the words defined in the Uniform Commercial 
Code. There is, however, an excellent recent law review article that considers the 
scope of the term. See Leff, Unconscionability and the Code -The Emperor's New 
Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485 (1967). 
83 No particular form of notice is required by the statutory language of the Code; 
nor does the Code contain any concrete guidelines as to what constitutes a reasonable 
time within which to give such notice. Comment 4 to section 2-607 indicates that less 
stringent standards are to be used where the plaintiff is a retail consumer. 
83 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CoDE § 2-607, Comment 5. 
"'See Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. 
L. REV. 791, 829-31 ( 1966). 
85 23 Conn. Supp. 416, 184 A.2d 63 (C.P. 1962). 
80 UNIFORM SALES AcT § 49. See generally L. VOLD, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF 
SALES§ 95, at 460-62 (2d ed. 1959). 
87 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (1944). Justice Traynor proposed: "[I]t 
should now be recognized that a manufacturer incurs an absolute liability when an 
article that he has placed on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspec-
tion, proves to have a defect that causes injury to human beings." Id. 
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erated his views in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Incorporated,88 and 
his opinion received the unanimous approval of his fellow justices on the 
court. In Greenman, the plaintiff was injured when a piece of wood he was 
turning on a retail-purchased lathe came loose and struck him on the head. 
He brought an action in negligence and breach of warranty against both the 
manufacturer and the seller of the machine. The plaintiff's expert witness 
testified that the use of inadequately set screws to hold the parts of the 
machine together caused the wood to fly out of the lathe. The manufacturer 
appealed from the jury's judgment for the plaintiff, contending that the 
plaintiff's failure to give timely notice of the alleged breach of warranty to 
the manufacturer barred his recovery.89 The California Supreme Court 
rejected this contention: 
Although in these cases strict liability has usually been based on the 
theory of an express or implied warranty running from the manu-
facturer to the plaintiff, the abandonment of the requirement of a 
contract between them, the recognition that liability is not assumed by 
agreement but imposed by law ... and the refusal to permit the manu-
facturer to define the scope of its own responsibility ... make clear that 
the liability is not one governed by the law of contract warranties, but 
by the law of strict liability in tort. Accordingly, rules defining and 
governing warranties ... cannot properly be invoked to govern the 
manufacturer's liability to those injured by their [sic] defective prod-
ucts .... " 90 
In the six years since Greenman, the decision has been praised by casenote 
writers91 and legal commentators,92 numerous cases have taken a similar posi-
tion,93 and the American Law Institute has adopted strict liability in tort in 
the Restatement (Second} of Torts.94 These developments prompted Dean 
Wade to say: 
The trend for the future is clear .... It will soon become the established 
rule in the United States that the manufacturer is subject to strict tort 
liability without regard to the requirement of privity .... Gradually a 
majority of the courts will slough off the warranty language and will be 
ready to follow the lead of the Restatement and the California court in 
frankly and accurately describing the liability as strict tort liability.95 
SS 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962). 
so The Code provides: "[T]he buyer must within a reasonable time after he dis-
covers or should have discovered any breach notify the seller of the breach or be barred 
from any remedy ..•. " UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-607(3) (a). See generally 
Dailey v. Holiday Distrib. Corp., 151N.W.2d477 (Iowa 1967). 
00 377 P.2d at 901. 
01 See, e.g., 36 CoLo. L. REV. 303 (1964); 15 STAN. L. REv. 381 (1963); 16 VAND. 
L. REv. 445 (1963). 
rn See, e.g., Laschcr, supra note 5 7; Prosser, Strict Liability to the Consumer in 
California, 18 HASTINGS L.J. 9 (1966). 
03 See, e.g., Shoshone Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Dolinski, 420 P.2d 855 (Nev. 1966); 
Marathon Battery Co. v. Kilpatrick, 418 P.2d 900 (Okla. 1966). See generally Wade, 
supra note 57, at 11-12. 
91 RESTATEMENT {SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). The Restatement position, 
however, is limited to "[o]ne who sells any product in a defective condition unreason-
ably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property .... " Id. at§ 402A (1). 
""Wade, supra note 57, at 25. 
280 UTAH LAW REVIEW [ 1968: 267 
Since most states that have adopted strict liability in tort have done so by 
expressly adopting section 402A of Restatement (Second) of Torts,96 section 
402A presents a logical starting point for determining the applicability in 
strict liability tort cases of defenses based on the plaintiff's conduct.97 While 
the section itself does not speak to the question, the accompanying comments 
are pertinent. Comment n provides in part: 
Contributory negligence of the plaintiff is not a defense when such negli-
gence consists merely in a failure to discover the defect in the product, 
or to guard against the possibility of its existence. On the other hand 
the form of contributory negligence, which consists in voluntarily and 
unreasonably proceeding to encounter a known danger, and commonly 
passes under the name of assumption of the risk, is a defense under this 
Section .... 98 
In addition, comment h provides: 
A product is not in a defective condition when it is safe for normal 
handling and consumption. If the injury results from abnormal hand-
ling ... or from abnormal preparation for use ... the seller is not 
liable.99 
There are only four reported cases imposing strict liability in tort with express 
holdings as to the availability of defenses based on the plaintiff's conduct. 
Three are clearly consistent with the Restatement views. In Shamrock Fuel 
& Oil Sales Company v. Tunks,1°0 the plaintiff's minor son had placed a stick 
with a glowing coal on its end in the bed of a toy truck and then asked a 
playmate to pour some kerosene upon the stick. The playmate did and an 
explosion ensued. The explosion occurred because the kerosene had been 
adulterated by the addition of gasoline after the product left the refinery and 
while it was in the delivery process.101 In rendering a plaintiff's verdict, the 
jury found that the minor son was contributorily negligent and that such 
negligence was the proximate cause of his inquiries.102 On their application 
for mandamus, defendants urged that absent a showing of privity of contract, 
a cause of action could not lie and that the finding of contributory negligence 
barred recovery under a theory of strict liability. The Texas Supreme Court 
00 See, e.g., Dealers Transp. Co. v. Battery Distrib. Co., 402 S.W.2d 441 (Ky. 
1965); State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113 (Miss. 1966), cert. denied, 
386 U.S. 912 (1967). The Appendix to Restatement (Second) of Torts lists all but 
the most recent of cases adopting strict liability in tort. Note, however, the Restatement 
takes the position that cases eliminating the privity requirement in breach of warranty 
actions are strict liability in tort cases. 
97 The section is perhaps the most controversial in the Restatement. One attack is 
that § 402A is a "radical change" from existing case law. See DEFENSE RESEARCH 
INSTITUTE, BRIEF OPPOSING STRICT LIABILITY IN ToRT; Smyser, Products Liability 
and the American Law Institute: A Petition for Rehearing, 42 U. DET. L.J. 343 
(1965). Another criticism is that, by excepting the manufacturer who does not market 
an "unreasonably dangerous product," the section has, in fact, "adopted a rule very 
similar to negligence." Note, Product Liability and Section 402A of the Restatement 
of Torts, 55 GEO. L.J. 286, 322-23 (1966); see note 94, supra. 
08 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 402A, comment n at 356 (1965). 
09 Id., comment h at 551. 
100 •H6 S.W.2d 779 (Tex. 1967). 
'
01 Id. at 780 n.1. 
102 Id. at 781. 
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acknowledged the definitional problems inherent in classifying a party's duties 
under doctrines of contributory negligence and assumption of risk and held 
that "contributory negligence," when defined as "the failure to use ordinary 
care,'"103 was not a defense.104 The court seemed to indicate, by way of dic-
tum, that misuse, submitted under a proper formulation and not as a catch-
all theory of contributory negligence, might well have been argued in the case 
at bar.1os 
Under the Restatement rule which the Tunks court adopted,1°6 a plea of 
"contributory negligence," as such, is insufficient. A finding of contributory 
negligence might reflect only that the plaintiff failed to exercise proper care 
in discovering the defect at issue and the Restatement disallows mere lack of 
reasonable care as a defense. Thus, under the Restatement, the defense attor-
ney must particularize the plaintiff's conduct on which he relies to establish 
contributory negligence. 
-----l. In Martinez v. Nichols Conveyor & Engineering Company107 the plaintiff 
was injured when the machine he was operating had a bolt shear off, causing 
an 800-pound weight to fall on his arm. Evidence was introduced at trial 
that the plaintiff's employee altered the machine in a manner contrary to the 
use sanctioned by the manufacturer and that the plaintiff knew of a recent 
failure of a bolt and the falling of a weight. The California District Court of 
Appeal held, inter alia, that plaintiff had failed to show that he was injured 
while using the product consistently with its intended use.108 Moreover, had 
the plaintiff's proposed instruction on strict liability been accepted, his knowl-
edge of the defect and failure to exercise,reasonable care for his safety was a 
defense to a recovery in strict liability~7" Similarly, in Ferraro v. Ford Motor 
Company110 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recognized that the defense of 
assumption of risk was available in an action based on strict liability in tort. 
The plaintiff in Ferraro was injured when the left front wheel of his new 
dump truck locked while he was making a left-hand turn. Conduct from 
which the jury might find that plaintiff knowingly assumed the risk was his 
prior experience with similar failures of the truck. 
The fourth case, Maiorino v. Weco Products Company,111 might violate 
the Restatement classification scheme. In M aiorino, the plaintiff cut his wrist 
while attempting to open a glass container holding a new toothbrush. He 
proceeded against both the manufacturer and the retailer who raised the 
defense of contributory negligence, and the jury adopted the defense theory. 
103 Id. at 782. 
1
"' Id. at 784. 
1os Id. at 785. 
100 Id. at 783-84 (by implication). 
~43 Cal. App. 2d 795, 52 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1966). 
{ 
1"/S2 Cal. Rptr. at 845. The critical issue in Martinez was whether the employer's 
uhsanctioned use was, in fact, the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries, and defend-
ant manufacturer and bailor ultimately prevailed on the plaintiff's failure to prove 
proximate causation "attributable to them." 
1
"" Id. 
110 423 Pa. 324, 223 A.2d 746 ( 1966). 
111 45 N.J. 570, 214 A.2d 18 (1965). 
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In affirming a judgment for the defendants, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
said: 
[W]e are of the view that where a plaintiff acts or fails to act as a 
reasonably prudent man in connection with use of a warranted product 
or one which comes into his hands under circumstances imposing strict 
liability on the maker or vendor or lessor, and such conduct proximately 
contributes to his injury, he cannot recover .... [T]he well known prin-
ciple of contributory negligence in its broad sense is sufficiently compre-
hensive to encompass all the variant notions expressed in the cited 
cases .... A manufacturer or seller is entitled to expect a normal use of 
his product. The reach of the doctrine of strict liability in tort in favor 
of the consumer should not be extended so as to negate that expecta-
tion.112 
While the first two quoted sentences of the above excerpt are extremely broad, 
the last two indicate that the Maiorino court regards contributory negligence 
as importing misuse (more than assumption of risk) and not a general stand-
ard of due care.113 Several legal commentators have so interpreted Maio-
rino,114 although Dean Prosser concludes that the case involves assumption 
of risk.115 Unfortunately, inadequate recitation of facts in Maiorino does not 
permit any determination of which view is correct. 
By way of dictum, four other courts have expressed opinions on the subject 
of defenses. In Greeno v. Clark Equipment Company116 an Indiana fed-
eral district court approved of the Restatement position. The Arizona Court 
of Appeals in 0.S. Stapley Company v. Miller111 stated: "[W]e have no diffi-
culty in determining that contributory negligence is a defense in a strict tort 
liability action." 118 Difficulty, however, does arise in determining what the 
Arizona court meant by "contributory negligence." Was the court using con-
tributory negligence in its general sense or as the term is used in this article 
- more restrictively to designate conduct amounting to misuse or assumption 
of risk? Indeed, the plaintiff's conduct in Miller - riding on the front deck 
of a motor boat rather than in the passenger compartment - clearly estab-
lished assumption of risk; there was, moreover, substantial evidence of misuse. 
Even more confusing is the dictum of the Illinois Supreme Court in People 
ex rel. General Motors Corporation v. Bua: 119 
In Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 III. 2d 617, 210 N.E.2d 182, this 
court adopted the theory which imposes strict tort liability on the 
112 214 A.2d at 20. 
113 See 2 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 56, at§ 16A[5][f]. 
n• See Comment, Products Liability-The Expansion of Fraud, Negligence, and 
Strict Tort Liability, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1350, 1385 & n.198 ( 1966). 
115 See Prosser, supra note 76, at 839 & n.254. 
11"237 F. Supp. 427, 429 (N.D. Ind. 1965). 
117 6 Ariz. App. 122, 430 P.2d 701 ( 1967). 
118 430 P.2d at 709. Interestingly enough, in a dissenting opinion, which opposed 
the adoption of strict liability in tort by the other intermediate appellate court in 
Arizona, the judge assigned as a reason for not adopting strict liability in tort the 
unavailability of the defense of contributory negligence. Bailey v. Montgomery Ward 
& Co., 6 Ariz. App. 213, 431P.2d108, 119 (1967). 
11
• 37 Ill. 2d 180, 226 N.E.2d 6 (1967). 
MAY] PRODUCTS LIABILITY 283 
manufacturer. Under that theory, negligence need not be proved and 
a plaintiff has only to prove that his injury or damages resulted from a 
condition of the product, that the condition was an unusually dangerous 
one, and that the condition existed at the time the product left the 
manufacturer's control. However ... it is necessary to prove that the 
plaintiff was in the exercise of due care for his own safety.120 
The quoted language from Bua indicates that in order to recover for personal 
injuries resulting from his using a defective product, the Illinois plaintiff must 
affirmatively show lack of negligent failure to discover the defect; in other 
wo~ds, the plaintiff, not the defendant, has the burden of proof on contribu-
tory negligence. 
A recent Illinois Court of Appeals decision gives the following explanation 
of Bua: 
Contributory negligence in a products liability case may be properly an 
issue, for while it is said that the plaintiff is not required to discover a 
defect ... on the other hand, if he discovers a defect, or if the danger in 
the use is known to him and he proceeds to use it he may be guilty of 
contributory negligence.121 
Arguably, then, Bua differs from the Restatement view only in terminology. 
Both Bua and the Restatement say, in substance, that failure to discover a 
defect is not a defense, but that use after discovery of a defect is. The Restate-
ment labels this latter form of conduct "assumption of the 'risk,'' while Bua 
treats use after discovery of a defect as contributory negligence. 
Most recently, in Dippel v. Sciano,122 the Wisconsin Supreme Court, after 
adopting 402A strict liability in tort,123 added by way of dictum: "The 
defense of contributory negligence is available to the seller. The plaintiff has 
the duty to use ordinary care to protect himself from known or readily 
apparent danger." 124 Language subsequent to this excerpt indicates that 
perhaps this court uses the term "contributory negligence" to include what is 
herein referred to as "misuse."125 
VI. EVALUATION OF DEFENSES 
Negligence, beach of warranty, and strict liability in tort have basically the 
same elements in a products liability context. None of the three theories 
allows recovery against the manufacturer or seller unless: 
( 1) the prqduct was defective; 
(2) the defect existed at the time the manufacturer or seller relinquished 
control; and 
(3) the defect caused the injury. 
120 226 N.E.2d at 15-16. 
m Dunham v. Vaughn & Bushnell Mfg. Co., 86 Ill. App. 2d 315, 229 N.E.2d 684, 
692 (1967). See generally 1 R. HURSH, supra note 56, ch. 1. 
m 155 N.W.2d 55 (Wis. 1967). 
=Id. at 63. 
:m Id. 
= "Defenses among others that suggest themselves are that the product must be 
reasonably used for the purpose for which it was intended; abuse or alteration of the 
product may relieve or limit liability .... " Id. at 63-64. 
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It is, therefore, difficult to see any logic in holding that X conduct is a defense 
to an action brought by a plaintiff when he alleges negligence, but the same 
conduct does not constitute a defense when the plaintiff pleads breach of 
implied warranty or strict liability in tort.126 Law governing assumption of 
risk and misuse is the same regardless of the theory of recovery: the former is 
an affirmative defense; the latter is an essential element of the plaintiff's case. 
Negligent failure to discover the defect or danger, however, is treated differ-
ently: in a negligence action such conduct establishes a defense; where the 
plaintiff proceeds under warranty or strict liability in tort, it does not. 
Realistically, the determinative factor should not be the form of action 
under which the plaintiff elects to proceed. The courts should, rather, con-
sider the central issue - allocation of the risk.127 The layman's probable 
inclination to hold the manufacturer liable for all losses on the theory that he 
is better able to pay is simply not practical. Such reasoning ignores the 
"economic facts of life." It is not the "deep-pocketed manufacturer" who 
will bear the losses imposed upon him - rather, it is the public who will have 
to pay as consumers. Thus, the real question is, in effect, What losses should 
the public pay for and what losses should the injured party have to bear. 
With this focus, it seems clear that both assumption of risk and misuse should 
bar recovery. Negligent failure to discover the defect is more tenuous. A 
large portion of mass-produced items is manufactured with quality as poor 
as the market will support and yet is advertised by conscious misrepresenta-
tions as to their known quality. Misrepresentation of high quality about a 
low-quality product lulls the consumer into unwarranted security in his pur-
chase; and his failure to exercise caution in using a product is merely a mani-
festation of the consumer's reliance upon advertising. Justifiable reliance 
should not bar a plaintiff from recovering for his personal in juries. The de 
facto victimization of the consumer requires that contributory negligence 
should not constitute a defense in an action for personal injuries incurred 
through use of a defective product regardless of the theory under which the 
plaintiff proceeds. 
l!l6 Prosser equates implied warranty with strict liability in reconciling applicable 
tort defenses; and, for this limited purpose, they are arguably indistinguishable. W. 
PROSSER, supra note 49; see note 56 supra. 
127 See Keeton, Recent Decisions and Developments in the Law of Products Liability, 
32 lNs. CouNSEL J. 620 ( 1965) ; cf. Calabresi, Some Thoughts On Risk Distribution 
and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961); Cowan, Some Policy Bases of Prod-
ucts Liability, 17 STAN. L. REV. 1077 ( 1965); P. Keeton, Products Liability-Some 
Observations About Allocation of Risks, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1329, 1334 (1966); Keeton, 
Conditional Fault in the Law of Torts, 72 HARV. L. REV. 401 (1959); Morris, Enter-
prise Liability and the Actuarial Process-The Insignificance of Foresight, 70 YALE 
L.J. 554 ( 1961) ; Plant, Strict Liability of Manufacturers for Injuries Caused by Defects 
in Products-An Opposing View, 24 TENN. L. REV. 938, 945 (1957); Weaver, Allo-
cation of Risk in Products Liability Cases: The Need for a Revised Third-Party-
Beneficiary Theory in UCC Warranty Actions, 52 VA. L. REv. 1028, 1037-47 (1966). 
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